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A B S T R A C T
Health interventions often depend on a complex system of human and capital infrastructure that is shared with
other interventions, in the form of service delivery platforms, such as healthcare facilities, hospitals, or com-
munity services. Most forms of health system strengthening seek to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of
such delivery platforms. This paper presents a typology of ways in which health system strengthening can
improve the economic efficiency of health services. Three types of health system strengthening are identified and
modelled: (1) investment in the efficiency of an existing shared platform that generates positive benefits across a
range of existing interventions; (2) relaxing a capacity constraint of an existing shared platform that inhibits the
optimization of existing interventions; (3) providing an entirely new shared platform that supports a number of
existing or new interventions. Theoretical models are illustrated with examples, and illustrate the importance of
considering the portfolio of interventions using a platform, and not just piecemeal individual analysis of those
interventions. They show how it is possible to extend principles of conventional cost-effectiveness analysis to
identify an optimal balance between investing in health system strengthening and expenditure on specific in-
terventions. The models developed in this paper provide a conceptual framework for evaluating the cost-ef-
fectiveness of investments in strengthening healthcare systems and, more broadly, shed light on the role that
platforms play in promoting the cost-effectiveness of different interventions.
1. Introduction
Health system strengthening (HSS) is a critical component of global
public health and international development (Frenk, 2010; Kutzin and
Sparkes, 2016; Naimoli et al., 2018). There is consensus that, alongside
spending on specific healthcare and public health interventions, there is
a need to invest in the complex health system infrastructure of human
and capital resources on which delivery of these interventions is
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dependent. In 2015, US$ 2.7bn of all spending on development assis-
tance for health was spent on HSS and System Wide Approaches glob-
ally. This was 7.3% of the global development assistance on health and
compared to US$ 10.8bn for HIV/AIDS, US$ 6.5bn for Newborn-and-
Child Health and US$ 2.3bn for Malaria, and assistance for System-wide
approaches and HSS actually declined from US$ 3bn to US$ 2.7bn
between 2010 and 2015 (Dieleman et al., 2016). Yet spending on HSS
may be essential if health systems are to secure the full improvements in
health outcomes promised by many interventions. Despite an extensive
literature on HSS, there is very little evidence on exactly what pro-
portion of funds should be spent on HSS to maximize outcomes from
constrained health budgets, or how they should be spent.
It was estimated in 2014 that around $274 billion spending on
health is needed per year to reach the ambitious Sustainable
Development Goals 3 targets on Women's and Children's health by
2030, of which around 75% of costs are for health system strength-
ening, with health workforce and infrastructure (including medical
equipment) as the main cost drivers (Stenberg et al., 2014). Strength-
ening the governance, financing and delivery of the health system to
ensure rapid progress towards the health Millenium Development Goals
was estimated to cost, by 2015, an additional $36–45 bn per annum, on
top of the estimated $31 billion that was spent in low-income countries
in 2009 (WHO, 2009). Providing the recommended care for mothers
and newborns was projected to require a larger share spent on program
and systems (US$ 17.7bn) than direct programmes ($ 9.1bn) (Singh
et al., 2014). There are hardly any studies that comprehensively
quantify the benefits and costs of HSS and compare them against
spending on specific interventions (Adam et al., 2012; Barasa and
English, 2011; Berman and Bitran, 2011). The analytical problem here
is that the benefits of HSS for population health improvement do not
materialize directly, but indirectly through the interventions that rely
on the health system for delivery.
The purpose of this paper is to develop an analytical methodology
that can model the impact of HSS on the cost-effectiveness of inter-
ventions and can inform the optimal balance between spending on HSS
and spending directly on interventions. The intention throughout is to
retain the principle of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), of seeking to
maximize the health benefits created by interventions subject to a fixed
budget constraint (Drummond et al., 2015). However, the standard
focus of CEA has been on the addition of an incremental intervention.
The innovation of this paper is that we explicitly consider how a range
of interventions may depend on a common service delivery ‘platform’.
This paper therefore differs from standard approaches towards CEA by
relaxing the requirement that the costs and benefits of interventions are
independent of each other, as a result of the common dependency on
the platform. We demonstrate how three types of HSS can be in-
corporated in the cost-effectiveness model, and we provide mathema-
tical formulations and simplified worked examples for each type. The
formulations are not intended to be immediately operational or ne-
cessarily realistic. The intention is instead to use the examples and the
models to bring out the essential features of the decision problems
under consideration. More realistic operational models can be devel-
oped for specific decision problems using the general principles out-
lined in this paper.
2. Background
The importance of interdependencies between health interventions
is reflected in the health systems literature, which recognizes that the
optimal design of a health system crucially depends on the balance
between different components of the health system (Chisholm and
Evans, 2010; de Savigny and Adam, 2009; Over, 1988; WHO, 2000). In
this section we briefly introduce the notion of service delivery plat-
forms, and the closely associated concept of economies of scope. We
then explain how the standard approach to cost-effectiveness analysis
fails to take into account these important features of many health ser-
vice delivery decisions.
3. Health service delivery platforms
Health service delivery platforms are defined by the Disease
Controls Priorities project as logistically related service delivery chan-
nels that collectively make up the organisational components of the
healthcare system, and mark the point of contact between service users
and healthcare providers, amongst which are included hospitals, health
centres and community services, see Box 1 (Watkins et al., 2017). The
definition of platforms is deliberately broad, so as to include platforms
that are used to deliver health promotion and prevention interventions.
From a platform perspective, HSS can be defined as investments in
specific inputs and infrastructures such as supply chains, clinical
Box 1
Five types of health service delivery platforms, Disease Control Priorities Project (3rd edition)
Source: Watkins, D., D. Jamison, and A. Mills. "Universal health coverage and essential packages of care", in: Disease Control Priorities. New York,
NY: The World Bank (2017).
Population-based health interventions: This platform captures all non-personal or population-based health services, such as mass media
and social marketing of educational messages, as typically delivered by public health agencies.
Community services: The community platform encompasses efforts to bring health care services to patients, meeting people where they
live. It includes a wide variety of delivery mechanisms. Specific sub-platforms include the following: health outreach and campaigns (such
as vaccination campaigns, mass deworming, individual education, and counselling); schools (including school health days); community
health workers, who may be based primarily in the community but also connected to first-level care providers, with ties to the rest of the
system.
Health centres: The health centre level captures two types of facility. The first is a higher-capacity health facility staffed by a physician
or clinical officer and often a midwife to provide basic medical care, minor surgery, family planning and pregnancy services, and safe
childbirth for uncomplicated deliveries. The second is a lower-capacity facility (for example, health clinics, pharmacies, dental offices, and
so on) staffed primarily by a nurse or mid-level health care provider, providing services in less-resourced and often more remote settings.
First-level hospitals: A first-level hospital is a facility with the capacity to perform surgery and provide inpatient care. This platform also
includes outpatient specialist care and routine pathology services (such as newborn screening) that cannot be feasibly delivered at lower
levels.
Referral and specialized (second- and third-level) hospitals: This platform includes not only centralized, general referral hospitals with
the capacity to provide secondary and tertiary care, but also specialty facilities (for example, specialized cancer-, cardiac-, and tuberculosis-
related hospitals). The latter may be distinct facilities or specialized units within referral hospitals.
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laboratories, physical buildings, diagnostic equipment, medical staff,
and data capture systems. Concern about HSS reflects the notion that
investments in such components of a delivery platform can yield ben-
efits across a wide range of interventions that rely on the platform. It is
this mutual dependency that creates the rationale for a system per-
spective (Smith and Yip, 2016). There are however few existing eva-
luative frameworks that take much consideration of such inter-
dependency.
4. Economies of scope
The idea of a platform is closely related to the notion of economies
of scope, which suggest that the production of two interventions by the
same entity is more cost effective than separate production, see Box 2.
The presence of the shared platform leads to a reduction in costs (or
improvement in benefits) compared with separate delivery of the in-
terventions. There is weak and conflicting evidence on the presence of
economies of scope in primary and secondary healthcare organizations
in LMICs. Secondary care (hospital) studies focus on three angles
(Barnum and Kutzin, 1993): (1) specialization on specific services or
patient groups versus delivery of a broad range of services (Flessa et al.,
2011; Rosenman and Friesner, 2004; Wholey et al., 1996), (2) in-
tegration of inpatient with outpatient care (Bitran-Dicowsky and
Dunlop, 1989; Custer and Willke, 1991; Wouters, 1993), and (3) com-
parative analysis of first-level and referral hospitals, for example district
versus provincial hospitals (Anderson, 1980; English et al., 2006;
Weaver and Deolalikar, 2004). More recently, studies analyse econo-
mies of scope at primary care (health centre) level. The majority of
studies focus on integration of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
with other primary care services, specifically reproductive health or
family planning services (Church et al., 2017; Das et al., 2007; Obure
et al., 2016), tuberculosis services (Koenig et al., 2008), or paediatric
care and vaccinations (Wilson, 2015). For a review see Sweeney et al.
(2012).
Surprisingly, most studies find either no or very minor economics of
scope on hospital or health centre level, with some even suggesting that
there are dis-economies of scope, implying that joint implementation is
less cost-effective than separate implementation. The difficulty of
finding empirical evidence of economics of scope is probably explained
by the problem that they materialize only if the shared platform has the
capacity to deliver the two interventions; if that is not the case, inter-
dependencies may result in incidental reductions in outcomes or in-
creases in costs of other interventions delivered by the same platform
although it is difficult to find empirical evidence of these impacts
(Gallagher et al., 2018; Kristensen et al., 2015). They can be avoided if
the introduction of a new intervention comes alongside investments in
the delivery platform. Indeed, studies on economies of scope between
interventions delivered by a newly established platform of integrated
community services do find evidence of economies of scope. For ex-
ample, the costs of integrating home-based testing and counselling for
HIV with those for non-HIV conditions (hypertension, diabetes, ma-
laria) were found to be very small, indicating potential economies of
scope though the studies did not explicitly investigate this (Chang et al.,
2016; Janssens et al., 2007). A 7-day integrated mobile testing cam-
paign that targeted HIV, malaria and diarrhoea was found to be cost-
saving (Kahn et al., 2012).
5. Standard cost-effectiveness analysis
Standard CEA assumes that interventions are independent, in the
sense that the costs (and benefits) of each intervention remain un-
changed whatever other interventions are implemented. This is because
a common focus of CEA in high-income countries is on situations where
a single new technology, most commonly a novel drug, is being in-
troduced into a health system, but the delivery platforms remain es-
sentially unchanged (Drummond et al., 2015; Vassall et al., 2017). The
standard approach can be represented as a simple mathematical pro-
gramme, the solution of which requires that interventions (assumed to
be independent) are selected for adoption in ascending order of cost-
effectiveness until the budget is exhausted (Crown et al., 2017). This
formulation ignores many practical complications but serves as a useful
starting point. The basic model is a ‘knapsack’ problem for choosing the
welfare-maximizing set of interventions with a limited budget B.
maximize x v subject to x c B ;
i
i i
i
i i
Box 2
Economies of Scope
Economies of Scope (EoS) are present when + < ++c x x c x c x( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 or + > ++b x x b x b x( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 . This means total costs of
providing intervention 1 and 2 jointly are lower than providing them separately, or alternatively the benefits of providing intervention 1
and 2 jointly are higher than providing them separately. Diseconomies of scope are present if + > ++c x x c x c x( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 or+ < ++b x x b x b x( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 . The magnitude of (dis-) economies of scope can be calculated by= + ++ ++EoSc c (x ) c (x ) c (x x )c (x x )1 1 2 2 1 2 1 21 2 1 2 or = + ++ +EoSb b (x x ) b (x ) b (x )b (x x )1 2 1 2 1 1 2 21 2 1 2So for example, if the costs of providing intervention 1 are =c x m( ) $1.51 1 , the costs of providing intervention 2 are =c x m( ) $2.42 2 , and
the costs of providing the two interventions together are + =+c x x m( ) $31 2 1 2 , then the value of the economies of scope can be calculated as
= + = =EoS 1.5 2.4 3
3
0.9
3
0.3c
If the benefits of providing intervention 1 are =b x Quality adjusted life years QALYs( ) 600 ( )1 1 , the benefits of providing intervention 2
are =c x QALYs( ) 15002 2 , and the benefits of providing the two interventions together are + =+b x x QALYs( ) 30001 2 1 2 , then the value of the
economies of scope can be calculated as
= = =EoS 3000 600 1500
3000
900
3000
0.3b
This measure indicates the savings or gains of joint compared to separate production, as a percentage of joint production. It shows that
providing both interventions together results in cost savings or outcome increases of 30%.
The concept of economies of scope was originally developed to explain the benefits of diversification of multi-product firms. A hospital
is the prime example of a multiproduct firm with its substantial economies of scope across the diverse healthcare interventions it delivers.
Hospitals provide an infrastructure of general services and inputs (such as administration, laboratories, diagnostic equipment, theatres, etc)
which are used and shared across a wide range of interventions. The costs of the platform can consequently be shared across all these
interventions, resulting in efficiency gains that can be used to reduce aggregate costs or increase aggregate outcomes.
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all x0 1i
Each candidate intervention i for adoption yields incremental ben-
efits vi and incurs incremental costs ci. Benefits vi can be measured in
natural units (e.g. infections averted) or with a generic measure of
health such as quality- or disability-adjusted life-years. The decision
variables xi indicate the proportion of intervention i implemented
(coverage). The model is solved to find the values for xi that maximize
aggregate health from all interventions vi, subject to the budget con-
straint B. This yields the usual CEA marginality condition that inter-
ventions are accepted if v c/i i , where 1/ is the cost-effectiveness
threshold. It reflects the opportunity costs in terms of forgone health
benefits, a measure of the ‘cost per unit of health benefit (e.g. cost per
Quality-adjusted life year gained or cost per Disability-adjusted life year
averted) forgone’. The smaller v c/i i, the poorer is the cost-effectiveness
of intervention i. In practice, the costs ci may include expenditure on
health system strengthening (HSS) specific to intervention i, or some
estimate of the contribution to the costs of an existing or newly es-
tablished delivery platform shared with other interventions.
Yet if several interventions rely on a delivery platform, they are
implicitly interdependent, and it is often impossible satisfactorily to
attribute to specific interventions the HSS costs that improve the quality
or capacity of that platform. From a systems perspective, therefore, the
costs and benefits of a specific intervention are often conditional on the
other interventions chosen to share the common delivery platform. The
existence of platforms introduces additional considerations into the
standard CEA framework. A decision to implement a specific inter-
vention may have positive or negative effects on the costs and benefits
of other interventions depending on whether it helps share the costs of
an underutilized existing platform, puts pressure on the capacity of an
existing platform, or introduces a new platform. We will illustrate these
three scenarios with worked examples, supported by mathematical
formulations. Note that the interventions we have chosen for the sce-
narios, and their costs, are not real-world case studies and are meant for
illustrative purposes only.
6. Typology of health system strengthening
6.1. HSS 1: investing in platform efficiency
Investments in an existing shared platform can improve the tech-
nical efficiency of the platform, i.e. the effectiveness with which a given
set of inputs is used to produce an output. Such investments could take
the form, for example, of new information systems, workforce training,
or improved laboratory facilities. The efficiency improvement will in
turn affect the cost-effectiveness of existing interventions that use the
platform, by either improving service quality and thus health outcomes,
or reducing unit costs, or both. Improvements in the quality of the
platform may improve the cost-effectiveness of many interventions, a
classic example of economies of scope. They may also change the re-
lative ranking of interventions with respect to their cost-effectiveness.
A previous study has shown how it is possible to identify the optimal
balance between investments in interventions and efficiency-improving
HSS using mathematical programming methods (Morton et al., 2016).
The innovation is to introduce an additional decision variable y into the
standard CEA formulation that indicates the expenditure on HSS. The
effect of spending $y on HSS is to scale the effectiveness of all inter-
ventions using a platform by a dilution factor of y , where < <0 1 is a
parameter reflecting diminishing returns to further investments in HSS
in terms of additional health gained. For example, y may capture the
additional costs of a ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) initiative for nursing
staff, imposing a cost in the form of nursing reimbursement, but also
yielding more effectively delivered interventions across the board.
Through the parameter y, HSS type1 is implicitly addressing the ease
with which technical efficiency of a platform can be improved. The
simplest case is to assume that y uniformly improves the effectiveness of
all interventions (Morton et al., 2016). The optimization problem is
then
+maximize y x v subject to y x c B ;i i i i
all x y y y0 1;i L U
The first term replicates the usual CEA objective with the additional
HSS scaling factor y . In this augmented model it is necessary to choose
the optimal level of HSS y in addition to the optimal proportion of in-
terventions xi, subject to the budget constraint B. Note that the costs of
y must also be considered in the budget constraint, highlighting the
trade-off between intervention coverage and HSS. Assuming boundary
conditions do not bind, this yields the marginality condition that for
accepted interventions vc
v x
y
i
i
i i i . That is, at the margin, the accepted
interventions are at least as cost-effective as further investment in HSS.
The HSS is an efficient way of improving the benefits (and thus the cost-
effectiveness) of all interventions using the platform, in a manner that
would usually have been infeasible if the interventions had not been
interdependent, and effectively improves the technical efficiency with
which the platform functions. This model captures interdependencies
on the benefit side, but it can be readily adapted to allow for the pos-
sibility that HSS is cost reducing rather than quality improving. It can
also allow for non-uniform impact of y on interventions, or for HSS as
an incidental consequence of introducing a specific intervention that
has positive impacts on several other interventions.
Consider the example in Table 1. Delivery of voluntary medical
male circumcision (VMMC) to 6000 patients and basic trauma services
to 9500 patients in remote facilities accrue total fixed costs of $7.5 m
and average variable costs of $200 and $500 per patient respectively.
Incremental health benefits per case are 7 and 5 Quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs) on average. Total cost per QALY of the interventions are
respectively $98 = ($484+$200)/7 and $197 = ($484+$500)/5,
assuming an equal distribution of the fixed costs across patients. Both
interventions are therefore within the country's current threshold of
$200 per QALY.
The decision maker needs to make a decision between investing an
additional $2 million on HPV vaccinations or HSS. An additional $2m
spent on HPV vaccinations would translate into 10,000 patients vacci-
nated, and generate 2 QALYs per case, with variable costs of $200 per
patient. In addition, we assume that it would allow the fixed costs of the
health facility platform to be shared amongst more patients, thereby
reducing the cost-per-QALY of the VMMC and trauma interventions. At
$247 per QALY, the HPV intervention alone would not be cost-effective.
However, joint provision of the three interventions results in a lower
cost-per-QALY ($141). As a result, considering the joint provision of the
interventions, all three interventions would be cost-effective using the
country's current threshold of $200 per QALY.
However, the additional $2m could also be spent on HSS (see
Table 1). For example, HSS may consist of introduction of an electronic
patient record system, which reduces adverse events and medication
side-effects, with a positive impact on delivery of care for VMMC and
trauma services, assuming a uniform increase in effectiveness for this
example. Note that the fixed costs increase in aggregate by the £2m
spent on HSS. The quality improvements would result in an increase of
QALYs gained from 7 to 9 QALYs in the case of VMMC and from 5 to 7
QALYs for trauma services. Under this scenario, the cost per QALY for
the two interventions are respectively $90 and $159; and the combined
cost-per-QALY is $128.
While both HPV and HSS investment are cost effective using the
country threshold ($200 per QALY), the additional $2m would be
better spent on HSS than the HPV vaccinations.
6.2. HSS 2: investing in platform capacity
Changes in the way an existing shared platform is used can improve
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the mix of services it supports, and therefore the allocative efficiency of
the platform, without necessarily increasing expenditure. Allocative
efficiency implies that the health system delivers the optimal range and
coverage of healthcare interventions. The second type of HSS therefore
arises from the joint reliance of interventions on a shared platform in
which some resource constraint limits the capacity to produce the op-
timal quantity and range of outputs. The objective of HSS in these
circumstances is to relax such capacity constraints.
There is a well-established literature on physical health system
constraints that may affect the optimal range of interventions provided
(Luboga et al., 2016; Wilson, 2015). Amongst the most frequently cited
are the limits in the numbers and skill levels of human resources. When
a new intervention is introduced that requires delivery by skilled health
professionals (say doctors), this may have a detrimental impact on the
cost-effectiveness of existing interventions that also depend on that
scarce resource for delivery. For example, in order to accommodate the
new intervention, the mix of inputs used in existing interventions may
be altered by shifting tasks for those services to less skilled workers,
resulting in a loss in effectiveness (Fulton et al., 2011). This unintended
spillover is an unintended consequence arising from the introduction of
the new intervention. Such constraints may arise not only through
human resources, but also for example through fixed capacity of facil-
ities, equipment or local financing.
HSS might therefore seek to relax the resource constraint by, for
example, training more staff to fulfil skilled tasks. Following van Baal
et al. (2018), a simple approach for modelling the decision problem is
to impose two separate constraints, say BL and BO for labour and for
other spending.
maximize x v subject to x c B x c B; ;i i i iL L i iO O
all x0 1,i
where ciL and ciO are the resource use of intervention i. There are now
two shadow prices andL O, and the decision rule is that interventions
should be accepted if +v c ci iL L iO O. Introducing the additional
constraint BL favours interventions that make relatively smaller de-
mands on labour. The effect of relaxing constraint BL via HSS is to allow
more interventions to be delivered and shift towards more cost-effective
interventions that could not previously be implemented because of the
opportunity cost they imposed by pre-empting use of the scarce labour
resource. The key investment trade-off is between relaxing the labour
constraint and relaxing the other constraint. Only when the two shadow
prices andL O become equal does it become optimal to invest in
general budget support, rather than in addressing the scarce constraint.
An alternative formulation would be to consider a different method
of delivering treatments which requires less intensive use of the scarce
resource. This requires a simple adaptation of the above mathematical
programme to include a revised set of delivery methods with para-
meters v c c{ ; ; }i iL iO , where <c ciL iL. It may often be the case that the
reduced use of the scarce resource leads to lower expected benefits<v vi i. Note also that a treatment can be delivered only once, so that
for all i the associated decision variables must satisfy +x x 1i i .
Consider the example in Table 2. Second-line treatment for multi-
drug resistant tuberculosis (TB) is currently delivered to 8500 patients
at variable costs of $200 and fixed costs of $882 per case and $7.5m in
total. At $180, the cost-per-QALY of TB second-line treatment is below
the threshold of $200 and it was therefore adopted. The country now
considers the adoption of medication to treat common cardiovascular
diseases (CVDs), relying on the same platform, a cadre of medically
trained nurses that is currently delivering the TB therapy. There is ca-
pacity to deliver CVD treatment to a maximum of 5000 patients, at
fixed costs of $1500 and variable costs of $100. However, CVD treat-
ment would not be cost-effective at cost-per-QALY of $267 if it were
implemented on its own with sole use of the platform.
The decision maker considers joint implementation of TB second-
line and CVD treatment. At first glance, sharing the fixed costs of the
platform might have the advantage that it secures a reduction of the
fixed costs per case for both interventions to $714 each and a favour-
able cost-per-QALY ratio for CVD treatment, compared to sole im-
plementation (see Table 2). However, the nursing constraint has ne-
gative consequences for TB second-line treatment: First, it reduces the
number of patients that can be treated, and second, it reduces the
quality of treatment from 6 to 4 incremental QALYs gained per patient,
for example, because the nurses reduce consultation times for patients,
Table 1
Investing in existing platforms (HSS 1).
Existing healthcare provision
VMMC Trauma Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 484 484 484 Fixed costs (total) 7,500,000
Variable costs (per case) 200 500 384 Variable costs (total) 5,950,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 7 5 Total costs 13,450,000
Number of cases 6,000 9,500 15,500 Total QALYs 89,500
Additional $2m spent on intervention HPV
VMMC Trauma HPV Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 294 294 294 294 Fixed costs (total) 7,500,000
Variable costs (per case) 200 500 200 0 Variable costs (total) 7,950,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 7 5 2 Total costs 15,450,000
Number of cases 6,000 9,500 10,000 25,500 Total QALYs 10,9500
Additional $2m spent on HSS
VMMC Trauma Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 613 613 613 Fixed costs (total) 9,500,000
Variable costs (per case) 200 500 384 Variable costs (total) 5,950,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 9 7 Total costs 15,450,000
Number of cases 6,000 9,500 15,500 Total QALYs 120,500
Total Cost/QALY 90 159 128
Threshold for adoption is a Cost/QALY ratio below $200.
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spend less time on writing patient reports or fail to coordinate care of
certain patients with other care providers, leading to increases in ad-
verse events or side effects that are not treated in a timely manner. As a
consequence, the cost-effectiveness of TB second-line treatment wor-
sens from $180 to $229 and is now above the threshold of $200 and
therefore no longer cost-effective if it were considered in isolation.
However, CVD treatment makes cost-effective use of the platform,
because it can share the fixed costs of the platform with TB treatment.
The 5000 patients requiring CVD treatment can now be covered at a
favourable cost per QALY of $136. If considered in isolation, the less
intensive TB treatment is not cost-effective with the addition of CVD
treatment, but the cost-effectiveness of the two treatments must be
considered jointly. The addition of CVD treatment leads to a net re-
duction in aggregate costs-per-QALY from $180 to $175, and so the new
scenario where TB and CVD treatment are delivered in conjunction is
preferable to the scenario where only TB treatment is delivered. In
effect, CVD treatment allows better use to be made of the fixed con-
straint, notwithstanding the adverse effects for patients receiving TB
treatment.
If policy makers do not want to accept the negative impact for TB
second-line treatment, they can invest in the capacity of the platform
(HSS 2) to reduce or relax the constraint. We assume that $2m are
spent, for example by hiring more nurses or giving them training. This
allows treating the original 8500 cases with TB second-line treatment
and improves the cost-effectiveness of both TB and CVD treatment. The
joint cost-effectiveness increases to $144 cost-per-QALY, compared to
the situation without HSS. The effect of HSS 2 is to improve the allo-
cative efficiency of the delivery platform by reducing the impact of a
binding constraint.
6.3. HSS 3: investing in new platforms
Finally, interdependencies can occur when an intervention in-
troduces the need for a delivery platform that has not hitherto been in
place, and that could be shared by other interventions. Investing in a
new shared platform could support a number of existing or new inter-
ventions. This type of HSS differs from the other two types because it
may expand the scope of interventions that can be considered for im-
plementation. It may also alter the costs or benefits of existing inter-
ventions, leading to a reordering of interventions based on cost-effec-
tiveness. An example for this type of HSS might be community services
in the form of a new mobile HIV testing and counselling campaign,
which creates a potential platform for other interventions including
testing for malaria, hypertension and diabetes (Chang et al., 2016;
Janssens et al., 2007; Kahn et al., 2012).
To formulate mathematically, we need to first consider a scenario
without the proposed platform;
maximize x v subject to x c B ;
i S
i i
S
i S
i i
S
all x0 1,i
where S is the set of all possible interventions that can be delivered
without the new platform, and viS and ciS are the associated benefits and
costs as in standard CEA. With the new platform this becomes+maximize x v z v
i S
i i
S
i P
i i
P
+ +subject to C x c z c B ;P
i S
i i
S
i P
i i
P
+all x z x z0 1; 0 1; 0 1,i i i i
where P is the set of interventions that could use the new platform, zi
are the associated decision variables, and CP is the fixed cost of the
platform. The health benefits obtained from the first scenario must be
compared with those from the second in order to decide whether or not
to invest in the platform. The additional constraints ensure that mu-
tually exclusive interventions (reflecting interventions that could be
delivered with or without the infrastructure) are selected only once.
That is, each intervention i can only be delivered with or without the
platform, or not at all. Interventions that cannot be delivered with S (or
P) will be attributed zero benefits viS (or v )iP .
A succinct way of expressing the comparison of the two models is as
follows: +maximize x v z v
i S
i i
S
i P
i i
P
+ +subject to yC x c z c B ;P
i S
i i
S
i P
i i
P
z My
i P
i
Table 2
Investing in constrained platforms (HSS 2).
TB 2nd line on its own (cost-effective, existing healthcare provision)
TB 2nd
line
Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs
(per case)
882 882 Fixed costs
(total)
7,500,000
Variable costs (per
case)
200 200 Variable
costs (total)
1,700,000
Incremental benefits
(QALYs per case)
6 Total costs 9,200,000
Number of cases 8,500 8,500 Total QALYs 51,000
Total Cost/QALY 180 180
CVD treatment on its own (not cost-effective)
CVD Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs
(per case)
1500 1500 Fixed costs
(total)
7,500,000
Variable costs (per
case)
100 100 Variable
costs (total)
500,000
Incremental benefits
(QALYs per case)
6 Total costs 8,000,000
Number of cases 5,000 5,000 Total QALYs 30,000
Total Cost/QALY 267 267
Joint provision of TB 2nd line and CVD treatment without HSS 2 (capacity
constraint)
TB 2nd
line
CVD Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs
(per case)
714 714 714 Fixed costs
(total)
7,500,000
Variable costs (per
case)
200 100 152 Variable
costs (total)
1,600,000
Incremental benefits
(QALYs per case)
4 6 Total costs 9,100,000
Number of cases 5,500 5,000 10,500 Total QALYs 52,000
Total Cost/QALY 229 136 175
Joint provision of TB 2nd line and CVD treatment with HSS 2 (capacity
constraint relaxed)
TB 2nd
line
CVD Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs
(per case)
704 704 704 Fixed costs
(total)
9,500,000
Variable costs (per
case)
200 100 27 Variable
costs (total)
2,200,000
Incremental benefits
(QALYs per case)
6 6 Total costs 11,700,000
Number of cases 8,500 5,000 13,500 Total QALYs 81,000
Total Cost/QALY 151 134 144
Threshold for adoption is a Cost/QALY ratio below $200.
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+all x z x z y0 1; 0 1; 0 1; {0,1},i i i i
The new decision variable y is set to 1 if the platform is im-
plemented, zero otherwise. The new constraint ensures that the set of
interventions in P can be implemented only if the platform is put in
place, the constant M merely being a sufficiently large constant.
Table 3 gives an example. Viral load (VL) testing of patients with
HIV is being considered for widespread adoption in primary care fa-
cilities. Because the test kits are not thermostable, adoption of VL
testing requires investment in a new cold supply chain, with high an-
nual fixed cost of $11m (including annualized depreciation). The in-
troduction of the new platform opens up the possibility of delivering
Oxytocin for the prevention of postpartum haemorrhage to 12,500
women giving birth, who are currently not receiving this prevention
intervention. Considered in isolation, Oxytocin is not cost-effective ei-
ther at $276, and has not hitherto been considered for adoption.
If the two interventions are both implemented, they share the fixed
costs of the putative distribution system. That is, the $11m cost of the
platform can be shared amongst the total of 21,000 patients receiving
the two interventions. Assuming an equal allocation across patients,
this results in a reduction in fixed costs from $1294 (VL testing) and
$880 (Oxytocin) to $524 per case, and a reduction in cost-per-QALY
from $213 to $103 (VL testing) and $276 to $205 (Oxytocin). Note that
this favourable cost-effectiveness can be secured only if Oxytocin is
implemented alongside VL testing, sharing the fixed costs. The
‘package’ of VL testing and Oxytocin has a combined total cost of
$18.95m, which is higher than the $12.7m required for VL testing
alone. However, the package yields an aggregate cost-per-QALY of
$155, below the threshold of $200, and therefore represents a good use
of these additional funds, provided they can be secured.
7. Conclusions
Much of the HSS literature is implicitly concerned with the need to
address opportunities and constraints presented by service delivery
platforms. Many constraints on decision makers arise from the existence
of platforms that impose an element of fixed costs on the health system
(Hauck et al., 2016). Platforms provide the opportunity to exploit
economies of scope, i.e. increases in cost-effectiveness of interventions
arising from their joint delivery. Economies of scope materialize if a
platform has some slack capacity, therefore reducing the unit oppor-
tunity costs for interventions that can use the platform. Economies of
scope however cannot be exploited if a platform has constrained ca-
pacity, therefore increasing the opportunity costs of relevant interven-
tions.
This paper has examined three classes of HSS associated with de-
livery platforms. They are (1) HSS that improves the technical effi-
ciency of an existing platform and is explicitly designed to increase the
cost-effectiveness of a range of existing interventions, through im-
proved quality, reduced unit costs, or both; (2) HSS that invests in the
capacity of a platform when interventions compete for a delivery
platform that has limited capacity, for example due to shortages in
human resources. Such shortages lead to inefficiencies because econo-
mies of scope cannot be exploited. The marginal benefits of HSS are
reflected in the reduced implicit prices of the constraints. Such HSS
offers the ability to shift towards more cost-effective interventions, in-
crease access to services, and therefore improve allocative efficiency;
(3) HSS that introduces a new platform to support a new intervention
that may create opportunities for cost-effective delivery of other in-
terventions that could share the platform. Economies of scope arising
from joint implementation make new interventions cost-effective
compared to a situation where they would be implemented on their
own. The paper illustrates these three classes of HSS with simplified
examples, and how they can be modelled mathematically. The principal
insight is that when there is reliance on a joint platform, interventions
become interdependent, and must therefore be evaluated as a portfolio
(Salo et al., 2011). Myopic focus on individual interventions can result
in misleading analyses when services depend on broader delivery
platforms, resulting in allocative inefficiencies within the system. Each
of the models presented examines the trade-off between expenditure on
HSS and expenditure on direct service delivery and seeks to find an
optimal balance.
Table 3
Investing in new platforms (HSS 3).
Provision of Viral load testing on its own (not cost-effective)
VL test Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 1294 1294 Fixed costs (total) 11,000,000
Variable costs (per case) 200 200 Variable costs (total) 1,700,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 7 Total costs 12,700,000
Number of cases 8,500 8,500 Total QALYs 59,500
Total Cost/QALY 213 213
Provision of Oxytocin on its own (not cost-effective)
Oxytocin Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 880 880 Fixed costs (total) 11,000,000
Variable costs (per case) 500 500 Variable costs (total) 6,250,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 5 5 Total costs 17,250,000
Number of cases 12,500 12,500 Total QALYs 62,500
Total Cost/QALY 276 276
Platform shared between Viral load testing and Oxytocin
VL test Oxytocin Total/
Average
Allocation fixed costs (per case) 524 524 524 Fixed costs (total) 11,000,000
Variable costs (per case) 200 500 379 Variable costs (total) 7,950,000
Incremental benefits (QALYs per case) 7 5 Total costs 18,950,000
Number of cases 8,500 12,500 21,000 Total QALYs 122,000
Total Cost/QALY 103 205 155
Threshold for adoption is a Cost/QALY ratio below $200.
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With this paper, we expand on the work by Morton et al. (2016) to
define the different ways in which HSS may influence implementation.
As with Morton et al., we see the health system as a platform that in-
fluences multiple interventions; and can do so in several ways either by
improving the efficiency of the existing shared platform (HSS 1, in line
with Morton at al), by relaxing a capacity constraint (HSS 2), expanding
on van Baal et al. (2018), and by providing improved coverage by ex-
panding the platform to new populations (HSS 3).
The models developed in this paper are consistent with standard
CEA but seek to model platforms and the associated cost structures
more realistically. The models for HSS types 1 and 2 are more applic-
able in local decision-making situations, where the details of capacity
constraints, service demands and other relevant factors related to in-
terdependencies are likely to be very important. HSS type 3 will often
be relevant to less incremental and more strategic decision-making.
Such reforms will often require considerable investment, occur less
frequently, and be taken at a more central budgetary level. However,
the distinction between the models presented is to some extent artifi-
cial, because many realistic decision problems contain elements of all
three types of HSS.
We assume an average level of efficiency in the use of existing re-
sources, following usual practice in most CEA (Calxton et al., 2015).
Eckermann and Pekarsky (2014) and Paulen et al. (2017) argue for the
importance of considering the efficiency with which existing resources
are used when assessing the cost-effectiveness of new interventions.
Our paper is examining the impact of health system constraints on the
conventional practice of CEA, so consideration of current use of re-
sources is beyond the scope of the paper. Economic analysis of HSS may
often be necessary when developing the range of services to be included
in a health benefits package as countries make the transition towards
universal health coverage. The implications of this research are that the
optimal package of care may depend on the health system
infrastructure in place, particularly in countries with regional differ-
ences in delivery mechanisms and system designs. Furthermore, if a
uniform national health benefit package is put in place, some localities
with atypical platforms may need higher levels of reimbursement so
that they are able to deliver the package or may need assistance in
reconfiguring their systems so as to maximize the efficiency with which
they can deliver the chosen package in the future.
We envisage that the next steps from our research may be the de-
velopment of decision rules or a ‘checklist’ of the type or types of HSS
that may accompany major adoption decisions. This would not only
provide structure to the decision problem and break it down into dis-
tinct steps, but would also illustrate what kind of data and empirical
evidence is required to help with informed decision making on HSS.
Fig. 1 is a simple illustration of the kind of steps that decision makers
need to go through when investing in HSS. A key feature of the decision
problem is the comparison of economic value of investments in HSS
versus a new intervention, or investments in HSS that are made
alongside introduction of the new intervention. Our framework in this
paper can be thought of as a first attempt to provide the conceptual
framework behind such a checklist. In the longer term, we need more
empirical analysis that sheds light on the role that platforms play in
promoting the cost-effectiveness of different interventions, more
methodological research on theoretically robust modelling frameworks
for planning, and more experience with using such models in the field
in real health service planning contexts. Only then can we hope to see a
truly rigorous approach to the economic evaluation of HSS investments.
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